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“Kant and Pragmatist Feminism”


ISSN-L 1799-3954
ISSN 1799-3954
ISBN 978-952-67497-3-0

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Kant and Pragmatist Feminism

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1. Introduction

Can Kant be of use to pragmatist feminism, and, if so, how? My answer is that, despite significant problems with Kant’s work from a feminist perspective, some aspects of his moral philosophy can be helpful to pragmatist feminists. I will begin by briefly explaining pragmatist feminism and then addressing two reasons why feminists rightly have tended to avoid Kant’s philosophy: (a) its emphasis on reason over emotion/body/nature and (b) Kant’s contributions to the development of modern scientific racism.

Even with these problems with Kant’s philosophy, however, his concept of respect for persons can be valuable for pragmatist feminism. Working from Kant’s *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1990), I will develop pragmatically the Kantian notion of respect for the dignity of others, basing it neither on rationality cut off from inclination and emotion (contra Kant) nor on self-abnegation (in agreement with Kant’s insistence on duty to oneself), but on relationships of regard for others’ commitments (in something of the spirit of Kant’s realm of ends). For help doing this, I turn to Josiah Royce’s concept of loyalty to loyalty as developed in his *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1995). I will argue that understanding Kantian respect in terms of Roycean loyalty can achieve three things. It helps feminists (i) avoid the emphasis on rationality central to Kant’s moral philosophy, (ii) reinforce Kant’s inclusion of self-respect as an important component of respect, and (iii) reduce the exclusionary aspects of the universalization of respect.
2. Pragmatist feminism and problems with Kant

The historical roots of pragmatist feminism date at least from the late nineteenth century, with Ida B. Wells-Barnett’s fight against the lynching of African American men and Jane Addams’s work with immigrants at Hull House (McKenna and Pratt 2015). It was in the early 1990s, however, that contemporary pragmatist feminism began to blossom, with the publication of Charlene Haddock Seigfried’s groundbreaking *Pragmatism and Feminism* (1996), in which Seigfried argued for the productive connections between pragmatism and feminism. As Seigfried demonstrates, both fields generally value intersections and question sharp dualisms, for example, between theory and practice, using theory to illuminate practice and practice to transform theory. They also tend to ground their work in concrete experience, eschewing abstraction for its own sake. To pragmatism’s typical emphasis on experience, feminists add the important question “whose experience?” helping pragmatism avoid generic accounts of subjectivity. Pragmatism, in turn, has developed conceptual tools such as the notion of habit that can be extremely useful for feminist analyses of gender/sexism and race/racism (Glaude 2016, MacMullan 2009, Sullivan 2001 and 2006).

Perhaps because of pragmatist feminism’s wariness of theoretical abstractions disconnected from experience and its suspicion that dualisms tend to uphold forms of hierarchy, power, and privilege, it has had virtually no engagement with Kant’s philosophy. When those concerns are combined with Kant’s explicit statements denying women political rights and affirming husbands’ domination of their wives, it is no wonder that many feminists consider Kant’s theory to be a classic model of sexist philosophy (Schott 1997b, 5; cf. also Christman 1995). While a small number of feminists have argued that Kant’s analysis of rationality can be valuable to feminism (cf. e.g., Piper 1997), like many other feminists, pragmatist feminists would disagree with the sharp and false dichotomy between reason and emotion that operates within Kant’s work. This is a gendered dichotomy that associates men with reason and women with emotion with the effect of subordinating women. It also tends to be a raced dichotomy that connects whiteness with reason and mind, and people of color with emotion and body with the effect of subordinating the people of color. Indeed, Kant can be considered the father of modern scientific racism not so much because of his racist claims about black people—plenty of scholars in his day made similar statements—but because he argues that seeking a
racialized order in nature, e.g., the chain of being, is an excellent regulative principle of reason (Bernasconi 2001).

As Dilek Huseyinzadegan (2016) recently has urged, however, feminists should not simply discard Kant. Nor should we buy into the sharp divide between the “good Kant” who produced a Copernican Revolution in metaphysics and epistemology and the “bad Kant” whose anthropology is racist. In spirit with pragmatist feminists, Huseyinzadegan argues that this is a false dichotomy, as is the choice between “good Kant’s” central texts and “bad Kant’s” peripheral work. After all, Kant himself understood his physical geography (anthropology) as a practical application of his metaphysical system. If feminists decide to engage with Kant, they will have to grapple with the problematic as well as the promising elements of his philosophy.

Instead of avoiding Kant, feminist philosophers would do better to occupy a position of “constructive complicity” with regard to his thought (Huseyinzadegan 2016). The contemporary sense of critique valued by many feminist and other philosophers is heavily influenced by/comes from Kant, to mention one salient example. Rather than necessarily contaminating feminist work, “‘complicity can be a starting point’. . . [allowing us to] recognize our ‘proximity to the problems we are addressing’” (Fiona Probyn-Ramsey, quoted in Ahmed 2012, 5–6). Being constructively complicit with Kant, we might ask how contradictions in Kant could be productive, such as the contradiction between Kant’s universal egalitarianism and his hierarchy of persons, and the tension between his cosmopolitanism and his Eurocentric geography/anthropology. Feminists need to inherit Kant, warts and all, rather than dismiss him as if he is not fundamental to critical forms of philosophy today (Huseyinzadegan 2016). There is no pure space to inhabit here, a point that both pragmatists and pragmatist feminists should appreciate.¹

3. Respect for the dignity of persons

How then might pragmatist feminists productively engage with Kant’s thought? In my view, the aspect of Kant’s philosophy that yields the most constructive complicity is its notion of respect for the dignity of persons. Kant explains dignity in connection with concept of the realm of ends, which results from the idea of rational beings guiding the maxims of their

¹ Cf. Schott 1997a for fuller criticism and partial defense of Kant’s philosophy from a variety of feminist perspectives, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
will by means of the universal law that they give to themselves (Kant 1990, 50). This realm is an ideal union of rational beings who treat both others and themselves as ends in themselves. It is ideal in that it might never be achieved in practice, but the realm of ends nevertheless helps us appreciate the dignity of rational persons. It also helps us understand that, in Kant’s terms, everything has either dignity or a price. Having a price does not necessarily mean that it has a monetary value or that it can be bought. Kant defines having a price as being fungible: things with a price can be made equivalent to each other, which is to say that they can be interchanged without loss (ibid., 51). Dignity, in turn, is that which is not fungible. Someone with dignity has no equivalent; they cannot be exchanged with someone else. They cannot be compared with or measured against another without a loss or violation of their personhood. In that sense, a person’s “worth” is not a price—market price or otherwise—but an intrinsic, unconditional quality that Kant at times describes as a kind of holiness (ibid., 52).

The intrinsic quality which gives a person dignity and makes him/her/them worthy of respect is a result of the rational ability to give the moral law to oneself because one appreciates the intrinsic value of the good will. Understood in this way—that is, as Kantian autonomy—morality is the sole way in which humanity is capable of dignity (Kant 1990, 52). Nothing associated with nature or the laws of nature is dignified; only the person who is free from nature and obedient to one’s own reason out of recognition of the good will is deserving of membership in the realm of ends (ibid.).

As many scholars have argued, the sharp opposition that Kant draws between reason and emotion/nature is untenable from both pragmatist and feminist perspectives (cf. e.g., Christman 1995, Dewey 1988, and Sedgwick 1997). Personhood need not be defined in terms of rationality divorced from nature, emotion, and embodiment, however. Rational agency (understood dichotomously) and personhood can and should be teased apart, as feminist philosopher Ann Cahill (2012) has argued. Cahill persuasively demonstrates how feminists can affirm the importance of respect for persons at the same time that they understand human personhood to be essentially and unapologetically embodied. Cahill’s positive focus on the body is an important corrective to Kant’s moral philosophy from which pragmatists and pragmatist feminists can benefit.

Yet even when modified to avoid Kant’s narrow focus on disembodied rationality, the concept of personhood can be problematic. We might
say of Kant what Kant reportedly said about a fellow human being in his “natural” state: you can’t put up with him, nor can you do without him (Royce 1995, 39). Respect for rational beings entails disrespect for other beings via the distinction, even if only implicit, between the respected group (“persons”) and another group (“sub-persons”) which does not receive the same regard (Mills 1998). Even if one expands the circle of who is respected—for example, by eliminating the criterion of rationality—the line must always be drawn somewhere. Include all human beings, not just rational beings, we might insist, but then the question emerges: why respect only humans? Do not non-human animals also deserve respect? Expand the circle to include non-human animals, and the question merely is pushed back one step: why aren’t plants, trees, and other non-animal parts of nature deserving of respect? Expand the circle further to include respect for the entire world, and, in theory, no one or thing would be disrespected. In practice, however, it is impossible for finite beings to respect others universally without reducing the notion of respect to a meaningless abstraction. Herein lies one version of the infamous severity of Kant’s moral philosophy. Respecting one concrete group, however expansively one characterizes that group, involves lack of the same respect granted to another group. The double-edged nature of respect thus makes Kantian respect a moral category that pragmatist feminists cannot live with.

At the same time, however, the notion of respect for persons is something that we cannot live without. Whether women, people of color, and other subordinated groups count as people worthy of respect is an important feminist issue, irreducible to other important issues such as fair access to and the just (re)distribution of material resources in a society. It is not merely or perhaps even fundamentally an empirical issue, even though it has empirical effects, and it is on this point that Kant’s philosophy is most helpful to pragmatist feminism. I hypothesize that the issue is an ontological one of personhood, a question concerning who the beings are who fully matter. Understanding the inequities considered below as ontological, rather than merely economic, helps make sense of them in a way that economic approaches alone cannot do. As I make that claim, let me be clear that, for pragmatist feminists, ontology is always grounded in history. Who beings are and whether they matter are matters born out of historical contexts and practices, and on this point pragmatist feminists would part ways with Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Yet they would agree with Kant that the question of who matters is something other or in addition to an empirically quantifiable question. While it is not an
*a priori* question—prior to experience—it is something of a transcendental question in that it concerns non-empirically verifiable conditions for the possibility of particular experiences of (sub)personhood.

The problem of gendered and racial injustice in the United States, for example, is not merely economic or social. It is ontological. It is the situation, sedimented by long historical practice, in which the personhood of women and people of color generally is regarded as less than that of men and white people. This is the problem of the value gap, as Eddie S. Glaude Jr. (2016) has called it in his analysis of race and white domination, or the problem of social value in Christopher Lebron’s (2013) words. As Glaude argues,

> We talk about the achievement gap in education or the wealth gap between white Americans and other groups, but the value gap reflects something more basic: that no matter our stated principles or the progress we think we’ve made, white people are valued more than others in [the United States], and that fact continues to shape the life chances of millions of Americans. The value gap is in our national DNA. Glaude 2016, 31

Lebron (2013, 42) concurs that American national character is problematically shaped by the marginalization of black interests and well-being, placing white privilege and white supremacy at the center of the nation’s normative framework.

We also can see the value gap with respect to gender in the fact that, when women in the United States take over an occupation that previously had been dominated by men, the salary for that work drops. It is this pattern—and not, as sometimes is surmised, that women might be less educated or less qualified or refuse to pursue higher paying jobs—that explains why American women’s median earnings have remained about 77% of men’s wages despite civil rights and other advancements for women in the United States (K. Miller 2017). As sociologists Paula England, Asaf Levanon, and Paul Allison have documented (C. Miller 2016), there is considerable evidence that employers place lower value on work done by women. The amount that wages fell varied across different professions, but even after controlling for education, work experience, skill sets, and geography, when women became park rangers or camp directors, for example—jobs that shifted from predominantly male to predominantly female from 1950 to 2000 in the United States—wages fell 57%. Likewise, this fall occurred for the jobs of ticket agent (43% drop in wages), designer (34% drop), housekeeper (21% drop), and biologist (18% drop). In a
reverse pattern that demonstrates the same problem, when computer pro-
gramming transitioned in the second half of the twentieth century from a
menial job done by women to a field dominated by men, wages and pres-
tige went up significantly. The feminization of labor is an important eco-
nomic issue with practical consequences in people’s lives, but economics
alone cannot explain these patterns, which I argue are grounded in the
disrespect of the personhood of women.

I am arguing that this economic data reflects or, we might say, is
grounded in something ontological. In Kant’s specific language, what the
wages (“prices”) listed above reflect is a question of dignity. This is a some-
what ironic claim, I realize, since it conflicts with Kant’s assertion that a
person’s dignity does not have a price. And yet, in capitalist societies es-
pecially, people’s value often is given an economic price, and it is Kant’s
philosophy that can help us recognize situations in which money means
more than money. In many cases, money is a sign of the value of the
person in society’s eyes. Understood in that way, the wages of American
women indicate that their average ontological value is about three-fourths
(77%) that of (white) men. In other words, the economic data reveals or
represents that they are about three-fourths less worthy of respect than
(white) men. The numbers are even more striking, moreover, once we
factor in race. While women in general might be ontologically worth 77%
of white men, that number hides differences among women of different
races. For example, based on their average wages as of 2015, we might say
that African American women’s personhood is worth about 63% (63 cents
earned for every dollar earned by white men in the same job) and Latina
women’s personhood is worth about 54% (54 cents) of that of full persons
(white men) (K. Miller 2017). (This data suggests that white women’s aver-
age wages are more than 77% but still less than 100% of that of white men.)

As Sara Ahmed (2017, 147) laments speaking as a woman of color about
the academy, “the very fact of your arrival erodes the value of what it is
that you enter, tarnishing something shiny”. This value is not monetary
even though it likely is related to a salary in this case. Ahmed made her
observation after a colleague, who was a woman of color, became a profes-
sor, and someone in turn remarked, “They give professorships to anyone
these days” (ibid.). The dignity of being in the academy drops—30%?
40%?—when “even” a woman of color can become a professor, which
might help explain the ferocity with which the discipline of philosophy
has fought to remain overwhelmingly white and male.
The claim about the impact of race on personhood is further supported by housing disparities in the United States that are racially patterned. In two similar suburbs in the Atlanta, GA area, for example, recovery from the 2007–08 housing collapse has been starkly different (Badger 2016). The houses in South DeKalb county look identical to those in North DeKalb, with manicured lawns and nearby golf courses, and both neighborhoods are owned by a similar set of middle-to-upper-class doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals with six-figure incomes. The houses in both neighborhoods lost a great deal of value when the real estate market crashed, but as of 2016 the houses in North DeKalb, a community that is predominantly white, had recovered most of their value. In contrast, houses in South DeKalb, a community that is almost entirely African American, are still worth 25–35% less than they were before the crash. Even after controlling for income levels, measures of housing quality, the effect of subprime loans and foreclosures, and how far prices fell in 2007–08, race stands out as the reason that houses in black zip codes in the South, and Atlanta in particular, have lingering negative equity. The real story about America’s current housing market no longer is about the devastating crash; it is about the crash’s destructive racial aftermath (Badger 2016). And that, I would argue, is an ontological story: it is a story that cannot be adequately told or understood without understanding the racial value gap in the United States. White people in America generally are considered to have more intrinsic worth and thus are deemed more worthy of respect than black people and most other people of color are.

A similar claim could be made about nations other than the United States. I have focused primarily on the United States because a great deal of economic data on gender and race in America is available and also because its gender and racial inequalities are so striking and persistent, but data reflecting similar economic inequalities is available for other countries, such as Brazil, the United Kingdom, and South Africa (Downie 2009, Stewart 2017, The Guardian 2016). In contrast, in countries such as France, which have outlawed the official use of racial or ethnic categories, data on racial inequalities is virtually impossible to find, but data on gender pay gaps is not (Pasha-Robinson 2016). In yet another contrast, in countries such as Morocco, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Nigeria, and Vietnam, there is virtually no pay gap, and women actually make slightly more than men on average in Morocco (Kauflin 2017).

The example of Morocco points to a related but different issue. While Moroccan women who work for wages have relatively high earnings be-
cause of their high education levels, only 27% of Moroccan women are in the labor force in comparison with 78% of Moroccan men (Kauflin 2017). In other words, Moroccan women do not have equal economic status with men. Perhaps they would not want it, however, since it often is seen as the duty of men to provide income and wealth for the family (Morocco would not be unique in this respect, of course, since this view also persists in countries such as the United States). Does their unequal economic status necessarily mean that they have a lower ontological status? One might reply that even if the United States and other capitalist countries measure a person’s worth economically, that does not mean that all other nations and societies must do so. Other measures of ontological worth are available, one might argue, and those measures might be more appropriate than economic ones in Morocco and other (non-Western) countries.

I agree that multiple measures of ontological worth can exist, and I do not wish to falsely universalize American value gaps. My claim is not that ontological worth is always and only reflected economically, and I recognize that representing dignity with money is a strong feature of capitalist societies in particular. It also is difficult to make global comparisons between countries that represent ontological worth financially. For example, are white American women worth more or less than white Bulgarian men, who benefit from one of the widest gender pay gaps across the globe but who still make less than American women on average (Kauflin 2017)? While I cannot answer that question here, I will point out that most nations in the world today use some kind of economic system, including currency, to remunerate labor even as economic measures of value might coexist with other measures of worth. It thus is a fair question to ask: to what extent are economic and other quantifiable inequities in a particular nation indicative of ontological inequities, across whatever ethnic, racial, classed, gendered or other axes of identity are salient in that nation? Kant’s notion of personhood can help us recognize that when persistent patterns of economic and other quantifiable inequities exist, something more than just mere numbers, financial or otherwise, likely is at stake.

4. Kant, Royce, and loyalty to loyalty

If pragmatist feminists can’t live with a Kantian notion of respect but also can’t live without it, then what should we do? Are there ways to develop Kantian respect that might mitigate its most problematic aspects? To grapple with these questions, I suggest developing another relationship
of productive complicity, this time with the pragmatist idealism of Josiah Royce. For pragmatist feminists, using Royce involves a relationship of complicity because of the racism and imperialism that saturate Royce’s social philosophy (Curry 2009). And yet his ethics can help us maximize the valuable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy. My goal in this section is not to make detailed comparisons of Kant’s and Royce’s ethics, which other scholars have ably done (cf., for example Foust 2012 and Grady 1975). My goal also is not to eliminate the tensions in the relationship that feminists might have with Kant (or with Royce, for that matter). Rather, I turn to Royce’s (1995) concept of loyalty to loyalty to flesh out a pragmatist feminist notion of respect that does not center on rationality, that highlights the importance of self-respect in connection with respect for others, and that resists exclusionary models of personhood somewhat better than Kant’s philosophy does.

Royce’s ethical philosophy never explicitly discusses embodiment nor, to my knowledge, does it ever directly address mind-body dualism. And yet it implicitly challenges, or at least bypasses hierarchies of mind and rationality over body and emotion by placing feelings of loyalty at its center. Even if loyalty is considered by some to be a quality or state rather than an emotion, it is clear that for Royce, loyalty is a passionate emotion. More specifically, Roycean loyalty combines passion with action. Loyalty is never merely a feeling or an emotion. A person’s felt loyalties drive her to do things in support of the causes to which she is devoted (Royce 1995, 10). There is a kind of duty to loyalty in Royce’s ethics, reminiscent of and yet reworking Kant’s notion of autonomy. Roycean loyalty is autonomous not because a person uses reason to give herself the moral law, but because she is driven by her own will, with “will” here meaning what a person cares passionately about in contrast to merely conforming to what other people think is interesting or important. Nothing external can explain why a person has a felt commitment to this duty rather than another one. Only her own will can make that decision in such a way that the felt commitment has force, even as the loyal person believes that the cause to which she is devoted is intrinsically valuable apart from her devotion to it (ibid., 11). In that way, the loyal person’s devotion to a cause bears some similarity to the autonomous person’s appreciation for the intrinsic value of the good will. And yet, as Royce insists in a much more Nietzschean than Kantian fashion, each person must learn and even create their own will (ibid., 16). “Your duty is what you yourself will to do”, Royce (ibid., 14) explains, “in so far as you clearly discover who
you are, and what your place in the world is”. Royce’s ethics thus gives Kant’s concepts of duty and will an existential-pragmatic twist, transforming Kantian autonomy into a passionately driven individualism.

In contrast with Kant, duty for Royce is never abstractly rational. While some scholars have claimed that Roycean loyalties are rationally formed life plans (cf. e.g., Foust 2012, 74), I am concerned that this understanding of loyalty smuggles too much Kantian rationality into Royce’s ethics. Royce does not claim that duty or loyalty is irrational; he instead sidesteps the rational-emotional dichotomy that fuels Kant’s philosophy. For Royce, loyalty is part of a life plan that is fully charged with personal desire and emotion. In one of the few places where Royce mentions embodiment, moreover, he explains that genuine loyalty is loyalty to something that can be interpreted in terms of “bodily deeds” (Royce 1995, 62). Royce is adamant that impersonal moral theories can only fail; morality must be rooted in something specific that a person finds gripping (ibid., 38). Listen to the passion in Royce’s words as he summarizes his “moral formula”: “Find your own cause, your interesting, fascinating, personally engrossing cause; [and] serve it with all your might and soul and strength” (ibid., 65). This is the only way that autonomy can be carried out in practice (ibid., 45).

Even as it is necessary, however, individual passion is not sufficient to satisfy the human need for meaning and purpose in life. For Royce, loyalty, as opposed to love, always involves devotion to an idea or a cause that is larger than the individual person. Loyalty is intrinsically social even as it is irreducibly individual. Loyalty weaves the individual in a social world through the individual’s passions, uniting her with others through the ties that bind them together (Royce 1995, 11). Loyalty to a cause larger than the individual helps an individual intensify her self-consciousness by helping identify and sharpen her individual will (ibid., 21). This provides a form of self-expression that might appear to be self-sacrifice, but in fact it is “selfish” rather than selfless in that the individual acts solely to discover and delight in who she is and her place in the world.

This point is important to feminists in particular because of the way that self-denial traditionally has been and often continues to be required of women. They often are expected to subordinate their interests and desires to others, be that their spouse, children, parents, students, co-workers, or whomever. An ethics that prioritizes self-interest and self-respect even as it does not pit the self against the other is one that implicitly challenges sexist expectations of women. This aspect of Royce’s philosophy also il-
luminates a productive tension in Kant’s work: Kant’s insistence on the importance of self-respect can be used as a tool to serve feminist aims, subverting the subordination of women in his work. Even appreciating this tension, however, pragmatist feminists will find that Royce’s ethics fits the description of an ethics that eliminates the selfish-selfless dichotomy better than Kant’s ethics does. By removing the requirement of rationality from respect and tying individual passions with broader causes, Royce counters both the disrespect for women and the accompanying self-denial of women found in Kant’s (and other philosophers’) ethical theory.

If respect in the form of loyalty is the highest good, then the more that loyalties flourish in the world, the better. This observation leads Royce to his version of the Kantian categorical imperative: with your loyalties, act so as to increase the amount of loyalty in the world (Royce 1995, 57). Put more succinctly, be loyal to loyalty itself. Royce’s call for meta-loyalty is no abstraction, however. His universalization of loyalty is not meant to uphold an abstract ideal, but rather to encourage people to think about how their particular loyalties support other people’s particular loyalties. We can see here again how Royce’s ethics includes self-interest even as it essentially connects that interest to the interests of others. Loyalty to loyalty never erases the fact that loyalty is a form of self-interest in which a person’s desires drive her loyalties. A person’s passionate devotion to a cause never disappears when she is loyal to loyalty.

The intrinsic connection between self-interest and the interests of others can take place in multiple ways. Just as there are two forms of duty for Kant, negative and positive, for example, there are two related forms of loyalty to loyalty for Royce. The negative form of loyalty to loyalty is to not conflict with or destroy other people’s loyalties with one’s own (Royce 1995, 63). The positive form is to support other people’s loyalties by the example of the passion of one’s own loyalty (ibid., 64). Importantly, in its positive form loyalty does not involve adopting or supporting other people’s loyalties directly. One can only be passionate about one’s own passions, and “selflessly” working for something to which you yourself are not loyal is not loyalty on Royce’s account. In fact, such selflessness is unethical in Roycean terms. But one still can and should support other people’s loyalties because loyalty often is contagious: it can inspire others to find and devote themselves to their own loyalties (ibid., 65). A loyal person’s passion can serve as an important model for others’ passions. As I understand the positive duty to model loyalty, moreover, it should not be associated with narcissism, egoism, or other forms of self-conceit that
lift oneself up by comparison with and dumping on others. If and when
loyalty is contagious, it most likely is enacted in a non-spectacular man-
ner. In addition, modeling loyalty is not achieved by lecturing or shaming
others into being loyal. (For more on the counterproductive ethical effects
of shame, cf. Sullivan 2014). The person who is loyal to loyalty is neither
self-righteous nor a show-off. For Royce, both negative and positive loy-
alty are important and, indeed, complementary. By serving one’s own
cause passionately and avoiding unnecessary conflict with other people’s
loyalties when doing so, a person can increase the amount of loyalty in
the world and encourage loyalty to loyalty in others.

What happens, however, when a person discovers that her loyalty hin-
ders or destroys other people’s loyalties? What should a loyal person
do then? In a Kantian spirit, Royce answers that it is disloyal, and thus
morally wrong, to break a loyal relationship unless a higher commitment
to loyalty causes the change. A person’s passions might change if she
realizes that that they extinguish the passions of others. But on Royce’s
terms, changing one’s passions should not be done out of self-negation.
It should be done out of a passionate commitment to passion and the de-
sire for the world to be a more passionate place. Out of loyalty to loyalty,
therefore, I might stop being loyal to a particular cause. Broken in this
way, however, my previous loyalty will still be something to which I am
tied. Royce gives the example of a person who is loyal to a gang of rob-
ers (Royce 1995, 97). This person is indeed loyal, but she is not loyal to
loyalty until she realizes that her robber loyalty conflicts with other loy-
alties. Out of that greater loyalty, she would break with the gang. She
would always have a special relationship with and obligation to the gang
members, however, because of her previous, narrower loyalty. This is an
obligation to help them achieve loyalty to loyalty by modeling it through
her life as a former robber.

The robber gang example helps demonstrate how Roycean respect for
loyalty allows pragmatist feminists avoid the Kantian problem of exclu-
sion that occurs when respect is tied to rational personhood. The key is
Royce’s claim that breaking with the gang—that is, no longer respecting
the gang’s narrow loyalty centered on robbery—does not involve the for-
mer robber’s scorning, abandoning, or otherwise disrespecting his fellow
and sister gang members. Drawing on Glaude (2016), we could say that
breaking with the gang need not create a value gap in which the gang
members are disrespected or seen as inferior to people who have left the
gang. Quite the opposite. The break in question does not cut off all ties.
Loyalty to loyalty instead brings about a transformation in relationships, one that includes a different and perhaps even a stronger responsibility to the former gang members since they previously shared a devotion to the same cause. The robber’s loyalty to his former comrades might even increase even as the content, or cause, of that loyalty changes.

Of course, the other members of the gang might not experience this change as one that includes ongoing respect for or loyalty to the members of the gang. They might experience the break as treachery, especially if they continue to be devoted narrowly to their cause. Indeed, I think this is a likely outcome of universalizing one’s loyalties, one that can make the life of loyalty isolated and lonely. I will return briefly to this issue below. But first, I want to adapt the robber gang example to analyze white people’s loyalty to their race and how they might live that loyalty ethically. Royce helps us see that more loyalty, rather than less—in the form of loyalty to loyalty—is the way out, or we might say the way forward, when it comes to eliminating white people’s habits of racial privilege and alleged superiority to people of color. Here is Royce’s robber gang story verbatim, this time with “robber gang” and similar references changed to “privileged white people”:

The once awakened and so far loyal [white person with racial privilege] would be found by his newly discovered loyalty to humanity in general, to break his oath to [other privileged white people]. But even in such a case, he would still owe to his [white privileged] comrades of the former service a kind of fidelity which he would not have owed had he never been a member of the [white privileged] band. His duty to his former [white privileged] comrades would change through his new insight. But he could never ignore his former loyalty, and would never be absolved from the peculiar obligation to his former [white privileged] comrades,—the obligation to help them all to a higher service of humanity than they had so far attained. Royce 1995, 97

For a white person to break with other white people who passively accept and/or actively seek racial privilege and superiority—that is, to break with a gang of white loyalists—would mean for her to live that loyalty such that it did not conflict with and perhaps even supported the loyalties of members of other racial and ethnic groups. (Note that as used here, the term “white loyalist” is not restricted to members of explicit white supremacist groups, but also includes white liberals who might consider themselves non- or even anti-racist.) For a white person to be loyal to loyalty in this way, however, would not mean for her to shun or disrespect
her former comrades. It would not create a value gap in which white loyalists were seen as inferior or disrespected. As a loyal person, the white person working for racial justice should not ignore her former comrades, but instead should transform her relationship to them so that in living their whiteness, she and other white people respect the loyalties of people of other races. As someone loyal to loyalty, a white person can simultaneously fight against white supremacy and racial injustice and be loyal to other white people (Sullivan 2012).

The same could be said for members of other privileged social groups with loyalties to their causes. For a man to be loyal to and then break with masculinity based on male privilege, for example, would mean for him to determine how to live his previous loyalty to other men in ways that do not conflict with and perhaps even support loyalties of women and other genders. (As with the white loyalist, the male loyalist described here is not necessarily a member of an alt-right men’s group, but includes most men in societies with gendered hierarchies that privilege males.) A man who is loyal to loyalty would not stop being a man, nor would he disrespect or ignore other men. He instead would have a particular obligation and fidelity to other men to help them transform masculinity so that it is no longer grounded in alleged male superiority and male sexual aggression. As someone loyal to loyalty, a man can simultaneously be a feminist and be loyal to other men.

In the case of both gender and race, however, it is likely that the person who is loyal to loyalty would be considered a traitor by his or her former comrades. From the perspective in which loyalty is always and only particular or “local”, transforming loyalty through its universalization can seem like a reduction rather than an increase in loyalty by allegedly destroying or abandoning concrete loyalties. Certainly this has been the case historically when it comes to race. In the United States, for example, the white person who has worked for racial justice often has been labeled a “race traitor” by the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups. While the use of “gender traitor” historically has been less common—although that is changing rapidly with the rise of so-called men’s rights movements in the United States—the notion of a gender traitor also operates with a sharp opposition between social groups and charges a person with betraying their gender. The “neomasculinity” website Return of Kings, for example, scornfully charges that some men are providing “vital reinforcements” to feminism by being “turn-coat gender traitors who willfully cannibalize other men to please their female overlords” (Sonofra 2013). These brief
examples point to the deep roots of exclusionary versions of loyalty and respect. Pragmatists and pragmatist feminists should not underestimate how socially and personally difficult it can be to universalize loyalty and respect so that they are not divisive. Here we see that Royce’s ethics also includes a severity related to universalization, albeit not identical to that of Kant. The idea of loyalty to loyalty might sound simple in its abstraction, but putting it into concrete practice can be a very difficult ethical task.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that for all the significant problems with Kant’s philosophy, his notion of respect for persons is valuable to pragmatist feminism. It illuminates racial and gendered value gaps that are difficult to identify or understand without some kind of ontological concept of personhood, and for that reason pragmatist feminists should be willing to become constructively complicit with Kant’s philosophy. However, respect for persons need not and should not be yoked to rationality as understood by Kant. It can be grounded in emotion in such a way that respect for people’s passionate attachments, including one’s own, is universalized. This is what is accomplished when we pragmatize Kantian respect with Roycean loyalty, and for this reason pragmatist feminists also should be willing to become constructively complicit with Royce’s philosophy. While it does not eliminate all the challenges of respecting others in non-divisive ways, Royce’s concept of loyalty to loyalty can help pragmatist feminists fight racial and gendered value gaps that harm people of color and women of all races.²

References


² Thanks to Chris Skowroński for helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper.


