



Jacquelyn Kegley

“Kant as Public Intellectual and Political Theorist”

In: Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński and Sami Pihlström (Eds.) (2019).
*Pragmatist Kant—Pragmatism, Kant, and Kantianism in the Twenty-first
Century* (pp. 273–287). Nordic Studies in Pragmatism 4. Helsinki: Nordic
Pragmatism Network.

ISSN-L 1799-3954

ISSN 1799-3954

ISBN 978-952-67497-3-0

Copyright © 2019 The Authors and the Nordic Pragmatism Network.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License.

 For more information, see
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/>



Nordic Pragmatism Network,
Helsinki 2019

www.nordprag.org

Kant as Public Intellectual and Political Theorist

Jacquelyn Kegley
CSU Bakersfield

1. Introduction

Claiming Immanuel Kant as a public intellectual seems to be a claim about a Kant different from the Kant revealed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet, the Kant as public intellectual is a Kant revealed in his public essays, and his letters on political issues. It is the views of this Kant that I believe provide grounds for finding similarities between Kantianism and pragmatism. In these public essays, Kant argues for the public use of reason, the freedom of the pen, the principle of publicity, and the necessity to make one's philosophical work public. He believes philosophy should initiate and promote enlightenment. He shares these beliefs with American pragmatists, such as Dewey and Royce, who argued that philosophers should actively address and speak about issues related to the lives of people and about public and political issues. Kant also argues for the role of public reason and actual deliberation among citizens. Deliberation among citizens and the public use of reason was another major concern of both Dewey and Royce.

Kant is not well-known for his political philosophy, but some contemporary scholars have pursued this aspect of his thought (Williams 1983, Arendt 1992, Foucault 1997, Clarke Weinstock 1996, Taylor 2006, Davis 2009, Riley 1979). Williams, Foucault, Clarke, and Arendt all focus, though in different ways, on Kant's notion of "enlightenment", on philosophy's role in this process, and on the role of the public use of reason. Thus, Williams argues that Kant believed the philosopher's role was to initiate the process of "enlightenment" in society and to seek to educate the pub-

lic (Williams 1983, 153). Foucault argues that, for Kant, the enlightenment is both a process, the process that releases mankind from immaturity, and an *ethos* or “*act of personal courage*”. Hence, Kant’s motto for the Enlightenment, says Foucault, is “*aude sapere* (dare to know)” (Foucault 1984, 34). Political scientist Michael Clarke argues that Kant’s central concern is to address the question: “How can reason take a leading role in morals and politics in face of political authority” (Clarke 1997, 56). Kant is concerned, says Clarke, with countering the charge made by priests and rulers that thinking for oneself is dangerous. Kant believes this leaves humanity in a state of immaturity; further, those in authority can exploit the fear, laziness, and ignorance of people. Kant recognizes that humans would rather be led, and he claims they lack resolve and courage. Thus, it is the duty of the philosopher to promote enlightenment and provide criticism of leaders (*ibid.*, 58-60). Arendt connects enlightenment with liberation from prejudices, from authorities, and with critical thinking. Critical thinking, she argues, has political implications because it is, in principle, “anti-authoritarian” (Arendt 1992, 32).

All these scholars stress the “principle of publicity”, described in *Perpetual Peace* as a “transcendental concept of public right” (Kant 1970 [1795], 125). Arendt argues that “publicity” is one of the key concepts of Kant’s political thinking. Foucault stresses the public use of reason, and Williams argues that the principle is a transcendental concept because “it is self-evident that for any rational person that any political objective which cannot be made *public* cannot also be made compatible with the principle of justice” (Williams 1983, 151). Arendt claims evil thoughts are, by definition, secret (Arendt 1992, 18). Kevin Davis argues that “The principle of publicity is formulated to answer the question of how politics may be pursued justly, i. e., in accord with the moral law” (David 1991, 406). Davis explicated Kant’s notion of “public law” as that which is “capable of being willed by all individuals of a public” (*ibid.*, 410). Kant, argues Davis, made Rousseau’s general will the public and its united will “a rational construct, an idea of reason” (*ibid.*).

Daniel Weinstock argues that Kant promotes a form of social contract theory that argues that the state emerges as a conceptual condition for “the possibility of a this-worldly realization of freedom” (Weinstock 1996, 392). According to Weinstock, Kant is concerned with stressing the need for institutional conditions for the realization of agents’ right to autonomy. His argument is that the *kind of state reason requires is one that insists upon the actual consent of citizens for laws* (*ibid.*). Thus, for Weinstock, Kant gives prime emphasis to public reason and deliberation among citizens.

This concern for public reason and public deliberation is also noted by scholars in philosophy of communication and rhetoric who have turned to Kant for a new understanding of the role of communication and rhetoric in the public forum. They are drawn to Kant's emphasis on the public use of reason. Thus, G. L. Ercolini writes: "Kant equates enlightenment with the public use of reason, underwritten by an underlying persistence, vigilance, and even insistence in demanding its use *at every point*" (Ercolini 2016, 3). Communication theorists argue that Kant provides us a basis for a philosophy of communication where reason is submitted to others in a public realm towards the goals of mutual interrogation and examination. Enlightenment, for these scholars, is an ethos of perpetual examination and inquiry (Stroud 2014). These themes have affinities with the ideas of Dewey and Royce of "deliberative democracy", especially with the emphasis of Dewey (1957) and Royce (1908) on the importance of communication and critical interaction to democracy. This does not mean, however, that Kant advocated specifically for a democratic government.

In what follows, I pursue the following themes. First, I will discuss the role of philosophy and the role of the philosopher as a public intellectual as well as one obligated to expose and criticize underlying assumptions, beliefs, and prejudices of one's time and society. As noted, above, a central theme for Kant was the notion of "free public reason". He gave extensive treatment to the concept of "popularity", and argued that philosophers were obligated to render technically meticulous philosophical work accessible and engaging to the broader reading public. One theme of pragmatist thinkers, especially Dewey and Royce, was the critique of philosophy as an "ivory tower" and esoteric affair. And like Royce and Dewey, Kant also emphasized "community", and in two senses: the human being as necessarily a social being and community as essential to the development of human enlightenment and maturity. Finally, there is the theme of "world community" and "universal hospitality". Sociability and communicability play a key role for Kant. He argues in his "Speculative Beginning of Human History" that the highest end intended for man is "sociability" (*Geselligkeit*) (Kant 1983 [1786], 50). Further, in *The Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant discusses a "*sensus communis*" and argues that one must admit that the impulse to society is natural to man and that *sociability* is "necessary for human beings as creatures destined for society, and thus as a property belonging to *humanity* [...]" (Kant 2000, 176). This leads Kant to his arguments in *Perpetual Peace* that the right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate, is one of the inalienable human rights and

that “*cosmopolitan right* should be limited to universal hospitality” (Kant 1983 [1795], 118). Kant’s ideas about perpetual peace and a federalism of nations are related to the ideas of Josiah Royce in his two works, *War, and Insurance* (Royce 1914) and *The Hope of the Great Community* (Royce 1916). These themes are also very relevant to current concerns about immigration and refugee status.

The philosopher and enlightenment

Enlightenment, Kant tells us, is “*man’s release from his self-incurred immaturity*. *Immaturity* is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another [...]” The motto of the enlightenment is therefore: *Sapere aude!* Have courage to use your *own* understanding (Kant 1970 a, 54). Crucial to the possibility of enlightenment, claims Kant, is freedom. And the freedom necessary is “freedom to make *public use* of one’s reason in all matters” (ibid., 55). Enlightenment for Kant is the point at which the human being departs from his self-incurred immaturity; it is the point at which a human being recognizes his or her autonomy. Kant believes that human beings are always responsible for their own affairs whether they acknowledge this or not. He fully recognizes that most humans prefer to be led by others and thus lack the courage to resolve to think on their own. However, the real concern for Kant is that this allows others, persons of authority such as priest and rulers, to exploit the ignorance and laziness and even the fear of these people. As indicated earlier, Kant is raising a central question, namely, “how can reason take a leading role in morals and politics in the face of opposition from political and religious authority?” He is criticizing the argument that thinking for oneself is dangerous. In fact, he believes that this ability is essential to humans in the actualization of their freedom. And it is the role of philosophers, argues Kant, to disseminate the message of the personal worth of all human beings and their vocation to think for themselves. Such an action must be a deliberate undertaking and in opposition to those who would prevent human beings from thinking for themselves. The educational project of enlightenment must be carried out in opposition to authority (Clarke 1997, 59). Although, Kant also believes that the ruler must play a strong role in facilitating the growth to maturity.

In arguing for the philosopher’s role as a public intellectual, Kant makes a distinction between the “public use” and “private use” of reason. For Kant, the public use of reason is “that use which anyone may

make use of *as a man of learning* addressing the entire *reading public*" (Kant 1970 a, 55). This distinction is made clearer in his essay, "The Contest of Faculties" (Kant 1970 d). This piece was written after his own experience with censorship of his *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793) under Frederick William I. The censorship occurred because of the outcry among biblical theologians who regarded any philosophical interpretation of the scriptures as illegitimate. The *Contest of Faculties* essay is his attempt to promote the university as the institutional location for the public use of reason. The universities in Germany in Kant's day were funded, much as public universities today in the United States, by territorial and municipal governments and thus university teachers were public employees. Because this was the case, governments assumed they had the right to censor curriculum and texts. Kant is addressing this situation in his essay, "The Contest of Faculties". Crucial to his argument are distinctions to be made between the four "faculties" of the academy: theology, law, medicine, and philosophy. He argues that the government has a right to take an interest in the activities of the first three areas because they have a much clearer and more direct influence on the lives of the citizens. Indeed, their recognized purpose was to provide ecclesiastical and secular officials for the government. Philosophy, however, was thought to be preparatory for these higher faculties. Given this mission, Kant argued that philosophy's only concern should be to speak the truth freely, to pursue scholarship, and to judge the teachings of the other faculties without the interference of the government.

In pursuing his argument, Kant's concern is for the enlightenment of the public, and the state. He writes: "*Popular enlightenment* is the public instruction of the people upon their duties and rights [...] the obvious exponents and interpreters [of these duties and rights] will not be officials appointed by the state, but free teachers of right, i.e. the philosophers" (Kant *ibid.*, 186). Philosophy should maintain a freedom of inquiry, characterized by public reason, examination, and critical engagement, since it does not produce candidates for civil positions (theology, law, and medicine) who engage in *private reason*, under the purview of obedience. The higher faculties, in his view, were more concerned with areas of life that the government could use to influence its people, namely, their civil well-being (law), their physical well-being (medicine) and their spiritual or eternal well-being (theology). Their primary goal is to teach obedience, without allowing subjects to take notice of the fact that their practices are founded on external sources: the Bible, the law of the land,

and regulations governing medical practice. Philosophy is not an instrument of rule. Philosophers speak as scholars, as public intellectuals, and as educators without strict adherence to the dictates of authority required in civil positions. The philosopher must engage in public reason and enlightenment to facilitate the people's discovery of their freedom and their own abilities to be thinking people.

Further, philosophy's role is discipline of the other faculties. Kant argues that the other faculties engage in conflict about who has the best interests of the people in their hands; they seek to influence the people by promises to guarantee happiness and they are often seen as "miracle workers or soothsayers or magicians" with privileged knowledge (Kant 1902, 7:30; Quoted in Clarke 1997, 69). Philosophy must challenge the other disciplines in public, not to "overthrow their teachings but only to deny the magic power that the public, superstitiously attributes to them" (ibid., 7:31). Philosophy needs to undertake this role today, especially as the public seems overly awed by science and technology and claims about persons being "only their genes" or only their "brains". The complexities of science and of studies of genes and neuroscience are overlooked or not understood.

Another crucial role for philosophy, in Kant's judgment, is to enlighten government regarding their own interests. He believes that the freedom to employ reason publicly in political matters would allow "for a better composition" of law through "candid criticism of the current legislation" (Kant 1902, 8:41). Further, the process of enlightenment is compatible and even dependent upon strong government. Philosophy needs the cooperation of political authority to achieve enlightenment for the people; public enlightenment requires enforceable civil authority; human beings can make free and open use of their reason within the context of humanly instituted and enforced laws. In presenting his argument, Kant appeals to the vanity of rulers as well as their desire to achieve effective government and good rule. Thus, he posits that rulers will get praise from the world today as well as in the future for getting rid of immaturity (Clarke 1997, 62). Wise rulers will realize that dogmatism, religious or otherwise, demeans his/her authority. In a bold statement, Kant asserts that a ruler must learn that his standing as a ruler is founded on the fact that he unites the people's will with his own (Clarke 1997, 62).

In his extensive discussion of Kant's political philosophy, Daniel Weinstock highlights the central role of public reason in Kant's arguments for the necessity of the state and Kant's concern for the autonomy and

freedom of persons. He claims that Kant has a type of social contract theory about the origins of the state, a type of civil association required by reason involving a kind of hypothetical deliberative process which allows assessment of the justification of laws and policies and which recognizes the limitations of individual human agents. It requires a context of free public debate. Weinstock writes:

Thus, the type of civil association required in order to protect each individual agent's pre-legal right to freedom is one that is underpinned by the idea of a general legislative will, a decision procedure characterized by reciprocity and equality, which assures that no one's right is left unprotected in legislation. Weinstock 1996, 399

This idea of a social contract serves for Kant mainly as a heuristic device which can be used by legislators. Kant writes:

It can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by a united will of a whole nation and to regard each subject, in so far, as he can claim citizenship as if he consented within the general will. This is the test of the rightfulness of every public law. Kant 1970 [1792] c 79; 8:297

Weinstock points out that this is a *formal and not a substantive constraint on legislators*. It counsels them to follow a procedure of judgment in policy making that abstracts from the actual or ideal interests of citizens, putting forth legislation that *could* be assented to by all agents as autonomous persons concerned to protect their innate right to freedom and not as holders of such-and-such a conception of the good. Unlike other social contract advocates, Kant does not believe laws should be based on a supposedly substantive conception of human welfare or happiness and, in fact, he argues against legislation on eudemonistic grounds. Citing again the limitations of human agents and especially the fickleness and variability of people's own conceptions of their welfare, Kant holds that such legislation would be ad hoc and unprincipled. He writes:

No generally valid principles of legislation can be based on happiness. For both the current circumstances and the highly conflicting and variable illusions as to what happiness is make all fixed principles impossible, so that happiness alone can never be reconciled under one over-arching conception. Ibid., 73-4; 8:290

Kant believes that imposing a single conception of the good upon people by the state constitutes illegitimate paternalism. Our freedom as human

beings, functioning as a principle for constituting a state, can be expressed, says Kant, in the following formula:

No one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek happiness in whatever way he sees fit, as long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law.

Ibid., 74; 8:290

This formula gives a significant role to free public reason and the ideal of deliberation among citizens. "If the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it [...] it is unjust, but if it is at least *possible* that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to consider the law as just [...]" (ibid., 79; 8:297).

In his essay on Kant's notion of "publicity" and its relation to political justice, Kevin R. Davis argues that "publicity" is a test of the moral rightness of a law. He cites the following Kantian formula: "All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity" (Kant 1963, 120; 8:381). Publicity constitutes an *a priori* test, like the categorical imperative, of a maxim's conformity with the moral law, and hence of its justice. As with the categorical imperative, it concerns self-destructiveness. Kant is contending that an unjust action *could* not be announced in public and still be permitted to take place. The fact that a law cannot be announced in public without creating conditions under which the actions could not take place shows that they are incapable of universality and hence not just. Kant writes:

A maxim which I cannot divulge without defeating my own purpose must be kept secret if it is to succeed; and, if I cannot publicly avow it without inevitably exciting universal opposition to my project, this necessary and universal opposition which can be foreseen a priori is due only to the injustice with which the maxim threatens everyone.

Ibid., 130; 8:381

As with the categorical imperative, one can apply an *a priori* thought experiment which Kant does with the idea of rebellion as a legitimate political act. He writes: "The illegitimacy of rebellion is thus clear from the fact that its maxim, if openly acknowledged, would make its own purpose impossible" (ibid., 123; 8:383-4). It would have to be kept secret.

Davis argues, against other interpreters of Kant, that this is an *a priori* test and not about seeking the actual demands of a public. Kant is

too convinced of the limitations of finite humans and knows that there is no guarantee that an actual public is a good judge of the morality of its leaders. However, philosophers as public intellectuals can be effective in informing rulers and the people of the consequences of their actions. Stressing always the limitations of finite human judges whose moral and political imaginations are limited by their socially and historically conditioned vantage points, Kant highlights and stresses procedures of public deliberation and the freedom for philosophers and others to express their viewpoints. He writes:

The freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the rights of the people. To try to deny the citizen this freedom... means withholding from the ruler all knowledge of those matters which, if he knew about them, he would himself rectify, so that he is thereby put into a self-stultifying position. For his will issues commands to his subject (as citizens) only so far as he represents the general will of the people.

Ibid., 85; 8:305

Kant emphasizes in several texts the epistemic importance of free public debate. Using the example of religious legislation, he argues that no contract committing future generations to specific doctrines can be valid. "One age cannot enter into an alliance or oath to put the next generation in a position where it would be impossible to extend and correct it knowledge [...]" (ibid.). The implications of Kant's claim are far-reaching as Weinstock observes.

The implications of this claim for public law would be quite radical. Indeed, it would mean that, since any given set of legislation is wedded to a historically and limited perspective and set of terms and concepts, it must be ratified anew or challenged by every successive generation of citizens, engaging in public deliberation so as to gradually 'enlighten' themselves through the gradually more complete elimination of morally arbitrary concepts and beliefs.

Weinstock 1996, 406

All of this, as Weinstock argues, stresses the epistemic importance of free public reason as well as, I believe, of the significant role of the philosopher in exercising freedom of the pen and thought. Recall that enlightenment is about immaturity and immaturity is a kind of heteronomy in thinking, relying on others to do our thinking for us. The remedy for immaturity in thinking is free public reason, where one speaks not from the contingent perspective of one's social position, but "as a man of learning

addressing the entire reading public" (Kant 1970 a, 54; 8:37). Errors of judgment in political and other matters requires intersubjective deliberation for their rectification so that agents can be freed of their taken-for-granted conceptualizations which they hold in a state of immaturity and which prevents them from exercising their full autonomy as self-legislating beings. It is the philosopher as a public intellectual who can bring about the enlightenment needed for our full freedom as human beings.

Thus, Kant's writings on perpetual peace, the context of faculties, and the enlightenment were works intended as a demonstration of the use of public reason by a philosopher and scholar. Kant also did not exempt his more theoretical writings from this demand. Kant, in fact, devised a plan to popularize the First Critique. In a letter to Christian Garve, August 7, 1783, Kant wrote: "every philosophical work must be susceptible of popularity; if not, it probably conceals nonsense beneath a fog of seeming sophistication" (Jaspers 1962, 124). For Kant, as already argued, the most important political freedom is the freedom to speak and publish. Arendt argues that this freedom is crucial for politics as well as philosophy. Thinking itself, for Kant, is dependent on the test of open and free examination. He argues that reason is not made "to isolate itself but to get into community with others" (Kant 1882). Philosophy, unlike science, which has a general validity because it can be repeated by others, must have validity in "general communicability". In his "Theory and Practice", he writes: "For it is a natural vocation of mankind to communicate and speak one's mind, especially in all matters that concern man" (Kant 1970 c, 85–6). Further, asserts Kant: "[...] the external power which deprives man of the freedom to communicate his thought also *publicly* takes away his freedom to *think*, the only treasure left to us in our civic life and through which alone there may be a remedy against all evils of the present state of affairs" (Kant, "Was heißt: Sic im Denken orientieren ", quoted in Arendt 1992, 40).

This brings us directly back to Kant's insistence on the principle of publicity. In *Perpetual Peace*, he asserts "the *transcendental formula of public right*: 'All actions that affect the right of men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with publicity'" (Kant 1970 d, 135). Kant considers this principle both ethical and juridical. This principle, as many have asserted, is central to Kant's political philosophy. It concerns the freedom of expression and the freedom of the scholar, particularly the philosopher, to speak and write publicly. Both the essence and context of this principle are contained in the following assertion by Kant: "The freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the rights of the people, although it must

not transcend the bounds of respect and devotion to the existing constitution [...]” (Kant 1978, 219). Again, the obligation of the philosopher, unlike other scholars in theology, law, or medicine, is to be defender and interpreter of human rights and the pursuit of truth.

Yet, we must see this in the context of Kant’s belief in loyalty to the state. Kant believed in obligation to the state and he wrote against the right to revolution. However, he also believed that a political leader would want to have good guidance to rule wisely. A good political leader would want to operate on truth and good information rather than ignorance. In Kant’s view, the greatest error a sovereign or political leader could make would be to deny the citizen the right to express his opinions freely, since this easily leads politicians to deny themselves access to information which help him/her to rule more prudently. For Kant, the only possible guarantee that the ruler will avoid unnecessary errors of judgment is that freedom of expression is fostered. This view of freedom of expression coincides somewhat with that of Mill who stressed that healthy competition in the expressions of opinions is the only guarantee that important views are not neglected and that better ones are considered. Thus, in Kant’s view, to be an effective leader, one must rule in the spirit of freedom.

It is not only about overcoming ignorance but also about persuasion and not coercion, consent and not dictatorship. Kant argues that “in all matters of human duties, each individual requires to be convinced by reason that the coercion that prevails is lawful [...] for every citizen, though he knows that obedience to law is essential for the maintenance of a peaceful, sable society, will be more content if that obedience is won and not forced upon him” (Kant 1975, 85). Through discussion and argument, citizen consent can be obtained for measures rulers decide to enact. A head of state, argues Kant, cannot expect people to merely accept assurances that he/she is acting in their best interests. Citizens must be able to assess for themselves if their leaders are ruling wisely. This is the reason there must be the principle of publicity: all maxims, laws, and policies *require* publicity so people can determine if they are in accordance with human rights and the ruler is acting in good faith and in their best interests. In Kant’s view, as already argued, the ruler only holds authority over the people because he/she represents the general will of the community. “Whatever a people cannot impose upon itself cannot be imposed upon it by the lawmaker either” (Kant 1970 c, 85). Knowing the intent of the law or policy, the people can inform the ruler where he has erred, and this is particularly the role of the philosopher.

Kant believes that freedom of expression is more likely to make a government successful. He writes: "And how else can the government itself acquire the knowledge it needs to further its own basic intentions, if not by allowing the spirit of freedom, so admirable in its origins and effects, to make itself heard" (ibid., 86). Thus, Kant defends the freedom of expression and the public use of the pen as a right of the loyal citizen to criticize the government. He assumes this is the right path to good government and an enlightened harmonious society. Such a view is much related to arguments by Dewey and Royce and others to defend deliberative democracy. Kant may be in error in assuming that the attitude of a ruler is one of good will toward citizens, but proponents of deliberative democracy may err in presupposing a settled, mature society which encourages argument and debate and which by a rational process will come to a consensus. All may err in presuming that legislators will be bound by Kant's hypothetical imperative to frame laws as if they are the general will of the people. What is needed seems to be a philosopher to enlighten and inform, to criticize and clarify, one who is impartial and represents a common understanding.

3. Sociability, judgment, imagination, impartiality, and the world citizen

Kant, as we have seen, asserts that our reasoning faculties and the path to enlightenment and maturity can only occur in a communal, dialogic context. For Kant, this belief is partly based on his notion of a common understanding, a '*sensus communis*', which is

A faculty for judging, that in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of everyone's else's way of representing in thought, in order *as it were* to hold its judgment up to human reason and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective. (Kant 2000, 173-4) [...] The following maxims of the common human understanding are [...] 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself. The first is the maxim of the *unprejudiced* way of thinking, the second of the *broad-minded* way. The third is that of the *consistent* way. Ibid.,174

Key to the unprejudiced way of thinking is imagination which is linked by Kant to "taste". Arendt argues that, in "taste", egoism is overcome; involved is intersubjectivity; the most important condition for judgment

is “intersubjectivity”. Judgments of taste, she says, “always reflects on others and their taste, takes their possible tastes into account” (Arendt 1967, 68). Kant speaks of beautiful art in terms of humanity’s universal feeling of participation and the capacity for being able to “communicate one’s inmost self universally” (Kant 2000, 229). Royce spoke often of the illusion of selfishness and developed a concept of “insight” that reveals my experience and that of my neighbor to be equally real and equally worthy of moral consideration (Royce 1880). Likewise, in his philosophy of loyalty, Royce argued that one must not devalue others’ loyalties although one may disagree with them and eventually find them wanting (Royce 1908).

The *sensus communis*, the idea of mankind, present in every human, leads Kant to assert that one is a member of a world community by the sheer fact of being human; this is one’s cosmopolitan existence. And by the virtue of world citizenship, one has an inalienable human right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate, and the right to universal hospitality. Further, for Kant, humans can be called civilized or humane to the extent that this idea becomes the principle of both their judgments and actions. The maxim is “always act on the maxim through which this ‘original compact’ can be actualized in general law”. This Kantian viewpoint is crucial to *Perpetual Peace*. Likewise, Royce’s notion of loyalty and community leads to the idea of a beloved community and to a notion of a federation of states, respecting the loyalty of each, while asking all to be committed to a world community of peace.

The capacity, through imagination, to think “representatively” and impartially is central to Arendt’s essay, “Truth and Politics”. Concerned about the conflict between truth and politics, she argues that “Truth, though powerless and always defeated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own, whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a valuable substitute for it” (Arendt 1967, 65). She claims that the standpoint of the truth-teller is that of impartiality and this develops in a mode of being alone. “Outstanding among the existential modes of truth telling are the solitude of the philosopher, the isolation of the scientist and artist, and the independence of the fact finder, the witness and the reporter” (ibid.). Arendt, like Kant, believes the philosopher must undertake the role of enlightenment and speak and write publicly to educate both the citizens and the state. Given our current political situation in the United States and the world, this may be the hope for a return to political leadership that is not afraid of truth or of extending universal hospitality to all—this would be a government that

seeks to act in the best interests of the public. This was truly an objective of the pragmatists, certainly of Dewey and Royce, and to a lesser extent, of James. Thus, the notion of the philosopher as a public intellect who speaks this truth to leaders is a common interest of pragmatism and Kant.

References

- Arendt, Hannah (1967). "Truth and Politics". *The New Yorker* February, 49–68.
- Arendt, Hannah (1992). *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, edited with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Clarke, Michael (1997). "Kant's Rhetoric of Enlightenment". *The Review of Politics* 59:1 (Winter), 53–73.
- Davis, Kevin R. (1991). "Kantian 'Publicity' and Political Justice". *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 8:4 (October), 409–21.
- Dewey, John (1957). *The Public and Its Problems*. New York: Henry Holt & Company.
- Ercolini, G. L. (2016). *Kant's Philosophy of Communication*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
- Foucault, Michel (1984). "What is Enlightenment?", trans. C. Porter, in: P. Rabinow (Ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (pp. 31–30). New York: Pantheon.
- Jaspers, Karl (1962). *Kant*. Edited by Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
- Kant, Immanuel (1882). *Reflexionen Cants zero Anthropologie*, edited by Bruno Erdmann. Leipzig: Fee's Verlag (R. Reiland).
- Kant, Immanuel (1902). *Gesammelte Schriften*. Berlin: Deutsche Akademie der Disenchanter zoom Berlin.
- Kant, Immanuel (1960 [1793]). *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (Die Religion innerhalb der Greene der blooden Vernunft)*, George Di Giovanni (trans.). *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row.
- Kant, Immanuel (1964). *On History*. Lewi White Beck, Robert E. Anchor, and Emil L. Fackenheim, (trans.) Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Kant, Immanuel (1968). *Kant's Philosophical Correspondence*. Translated and Edited by Anrulf Zweig. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kant, Immanuel (1970 [1784]) a. "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?' ", trans. H. N. Nisbet, in: H. S. Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (pp. 54–60). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel (1970 [1786]) b. "Speculative Beginning of Human History", trans. H. N. Nisbet, in: H. S. Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (pp. 49–60). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kant, Immanuel (1970 [1792]) c. "Theory and Practice", trans. H. N. Nisbet, in: H. S. Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (pp. 61–92). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel (1970 [1795]) d. "Perpetual Peace", trans. H. B. Nisbet, in: H. S. Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (pp. 93–130). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel (1970 [1798]) e. "The Contest of the Faculties", trans. H. B. Nisbet, in: H. S. Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (pp. 177–190). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel (1978 [1798]). *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. V. L. Dowdell. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel (2000 [1790]). *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Translated by Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews. Edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reily, Patrick (1979). "Federalism in Kant's Political Philosophy". *Publius* Fall, 43–64.
- Royce, Josiah (1880). "Tests of Right and Wrong", in: *Fugitive Essays*, edited with an Introduction by Jacob Lowenberg (pp. 187–218). Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, Inc.
- Royce, Josiah (1908). "On Certain Limitations of the Thoughtful Public in America", in: *Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems*. New York: Macmillan Company.
- Royce, Josiah (1908). *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. New York: Macmillan.
- Royce, Josiah (1916). *The Hope of the Great Community*. New York: Macmillan.
- Royce, Josiah (1959). *The World and the Individual*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan Company.
- Schott, Robin May (2009). "Kant and Arendt on Hospitality". *Annual Review of Law and Ethics* 17, 193–94.
- Scott Stroud (2014). *Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric*. University Park: Penn State University Press.
- Taylor, Robert S. (2006). "Democratic Transitions and the Progress of Absolutism in Kant's Political Thought". *The Journal of Politics* 69:3 (August), 556–70.
- Weinstock, Daniel M. (1996). "Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant's Political Philosophy". *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26:3 (September), 389–411.
- Williams, Howard (1983). *Kant's Political Writings*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.